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Four years ago, on the fiftieth anniversary of the watershed 1966 reforms of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I had the opportunity to interview my 
colleague and friend Arthur Miller on the transformation of Rule 23.1 Beginning 
in the early 1960s when the Rules Committee commenced its work on 
overhauling the joinder rules, Miller was much the junior participant in that 
process, leaving him now the only living memory of the discussions and debates 
that launched modern class action process. As an assistant to Benjamin Kaplan, 
the Reporter on the amendments, Miller served as scribe, draftsman, confidante, 
and shrewd observer to the lions of the legal world giving birth to a powerful new 
litigation tool. The theme of an old guard confronting and trying to contain a new 
world is a constant in literature, from Shakespeare to Chekhov, and is always 
filled with drama, misperception, and yet the potential for great insight. Though 
perhaps not quite imparting those epic themes, in its own way our little 
procedural innovation was a great story of the past giving birth to the future. And 
Miller is always a great storyteller. 
At the end of the interview, I asked Miller what he thought the reaction of 
those gathered a half-century earlier would have been to some of the further 
reaches of class action law today.2 Such cross-temporal questions are always hard 
as it requires projecting forward from a world in which jet planes had only 
recently come on line for commercial travel, the fax machine was a decade away, 
legal pleadings were still typed by hand, and the first photocopier had only 
recently come to market. But the seeds of the present can always be found in the 
past, and the question was what elements would have been recognizable even 
across technological frontiers. 
To ground the discussion, I inquired about what reactions might have been to 
three of the largest class action cases of recent times: the Deepwater Horizon 
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 1.  Samuel Issacharoff & Peter Zimroth, An Oral History of Rule 23: An Interview with Professor 
Arthur Miller, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 105 (2018) [hereinafter Miller]. 
 2.  Id. at 124–27. 
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litigation in the Fifth Circuit,3 the Volkswagen emissions case in the Ninth 
Circuit,4 and the NFL Concussion litigation in the Third Circuit.5 Like so many 
cases, large and small, each had yielded a settlement that was in turn subject to 
challenge by objectors of various kinds, including a settling party itself—British 
Petroleum—in the Fifth Circuit.6 
The pervasive fact of settlement by itself marked an evolution in class action 
practice, and the term “settlement” did not appear in the 1966 version of the 
Rules. As Miller captured the ethos of the time, a class action was conceived of 
as “trial-ready.”7 The word “settlement” did not appear in the Rules at all until 
1983 when Miller, serving as the Reporter to the Advisory Committee, 
introduced it into the new found managerial powers of the courts under Rule 16.8 
The term did not appear in Rule 23 until 2003 when Rule 23(e) was changed from 
“Dismissal or Compromise” to “Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or 
Compromise.” And only in 2018 was Rule 23 amended to reach “a class proposed 
to be certified for purposes of settlement[.]”9 Even so, as the Supreme Court 
noted in 1997, and even without formal amendment, “[a]mong current 
applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the ‘settlement only’ class ha[d] become a stock 
device.”10 On this view, the Rules provide guidance, “[b]ut they are not all 
encompassing.”11 
In teaching complex litigation together, Miller and I had remarked that when 
he served as Reporter for the Complex Litigation Project of the American Law 
Institute12 in the 1980s, the main focus had been trying to harmonize state and 
federal cases for common trial; there had been no discussion of judicial oversight 
of settlement. By the time I served as Reporter for the Aggregate Litigation 
Project twenty years later, one of the main themes became the role and proper 
regulation of settlement.13 Aggregate litigation had been reorganized on the 
ground, with the organizing principle being settlement rather than trial. But that 
 
 3.  In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 744 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 4.  In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg. Litig., 895 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 5.  In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 6.  I must disclose having participated in these cases, including as counsel on appeal. Nothing 
presented here goes beyond the public record in decisions in the cases. 
 7.  Miller, supra note 1, at 126. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (introductory paragraph); accord id. at 23(c)(2)(B) (adopted in 2018, 
referring “to a class proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement under Rule 23(b)(3)”). 
 10.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997). 
 11.  Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016). 
 12.  AM. L. INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
(1994). 
 13.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 3.01, 3.02 (AM. L. INST. 2010) 
(discussing “General Settlement Principles” and “Court Approval of a Class-Action Settlement”). 
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transformation had to be fitted within Rules designed with adjudication in mind.14 
We had all learned from judicial experience.15 
The prevalence of class action settlements might have been new, but certainly 
disputes have reached resolution without formal adjudication for as long as there 
has been law. And the practices of non-adjudicatory resolution would no doubt 
move into every litigated domain. Of more immediate concern was the sheer 
scale of these cases involving many billions of dollars, thousands of claimants, 
complex interplays between state and federal law, and the driving force of a 
formidable plaintiffs’ bar in facing down some of the most powerful institutional 
actors in the economy. 
For Miller, the scale may have been unimaginable, but the inquiries actually 
fell into recognizable patterns. For example, the Volkswagen emissions litigation 
involved improper conduct of a single critical market actor, something that could 
be seen as a consumer-protection extension of the antitrust cases that were well-
known in the mid-twentieth century.16 The expansion of antitrust in the 1960s 
followed on the colossal action against the Alcoa aluminum monopoly and would 
lead to the extraordinary lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice in 1974 that 
led to the break-up of the ATT monopoly. Similarly, the Deepwater Horizon 
calamity was the product of a single-event accident organized around the 
potential fault-based liability of a primary defendant, and perhaps some related 
parties. This was not different in kind from the mass harms caused by an airplane 
crash or a hotel fire, the kinds of tort actions that were not only known to the 
Rules Committee, but were the prompts for the coordination offered by the 
Multidistrict Litigation statute that quickly followed in 1968.17 
But the one that stood apart was In re National Football League Players 
Concussion Injury Litigation (NFL Concussion),18 a case Miller believed would 
have given the Rules adopters grave pause.19 Certainly, this view had support in 
the drafting history of the Rules. In the language of the Rules Committee in 1966, 
“mass accident” cases, such as airplane crashes or hotel fires, were seen as likely 
presenting too many idiosyncratic individual issues, such that what are now called 
mass torts would be “ordinarily not appropriate” for class treatment.20 Judicial 
skepticism over mass tort class actions would define the Supreme Court’s 
 
 14.  See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1716 (2012) 
(“Because the drafters of the Federal Rules placed the mechanisms for robust merits adjudication at the 
end of the litigation process, those mechanisms are largely unavailable to influence settlement outcomes 
in a world without trials.”) (footnote omitted). 
 15.  Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 819 (2010) (“68 percent of the federal [class action] settlements in 2006 
and 2007 were settlement classes.”). 
 16.  See generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct Under the 
Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809 (2000). 
 17.  28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 18.  821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016) (MDL No. 2323). 
 19.  Miller, supra note 1, at 125. 
 20.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (quoting the Committee for the 1966 
revision of Rule 23). 
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participation in the field for a generation in reaction to expansive asbestos 
settlements.21 Those rulings tended to suggest that, “in most personal injury class 
actions, individual issues outweigh common issues, thus disqualifying such 
actions on predominance and manageability grounds”—even if some latitude 
might be given to settlements.22 
Although not the only example of mass torts that were resolved through class 
actions, NFL Concussion was no doubt the most high profile, as would be almost 
anything involving the NFL. What is most striking about the NFL decision is the 
care that Judge Ambro, on behalf of unanimous panel, took to fit the decision 
within well-trod guidelines for reviewing class actions. This meant not only 
walking the settlement through the various Rule 23 factors, but through the 
multi-step analysis offered in the Third Circuit for the approval of settlements.23 
Certainly the NFL class was less sweeping than the comprehensive class 
definition certified by the district court in Amchem, one that consisted of all 
persons in the United States who might have been exposed occupationally to 
asbestos and to all household members who were in contact with them.24 Also, 
the NFL class created clear subclasses, with separate representation, for those 
who had present manifestation of harm and those who only faced the prospect of 
various neurocognitive impairments as a result of years of concussive hits.25 But 
the real difference lay elsewhere. The gulf between Amchem and NFL 
Concussion reflects both a measure of judicial confidence in the ability to handle 
increasingly complex class actions, and a different focus on what is at stake in 
these cases. Simply put, Amchem reads as a tale of loss, in which individual tort 
claimants have relinquished their autonomous rights to pursue individual 
litigation. By contrast, NFL Concussion presents as a triumph of collective 
redress, one in which joint prosecution and resolution allowed the class of retired 
football players to overcome several formidable defenses26 and to induce 
dispositive resolution for the NFL. 
NFL Concussion opens another window on the role of the class action. Broad 
areas of class adjudication are being compromised, if not eviscerated, by 
 
 21.  See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the 
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 677–82 (1979) (describing that history); see also John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 372–73 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court’s asbestos cases “chilled” the 
more expansive use of class actions); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class 
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 352 (describing how mass tort cases prompted the Supreme Court to 
address “the conditions that call for aggregate treatment of the perceived class injury”); D. Theodore 
Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (2013) (tracing 
the application of class action principles in the World Trade Center litigation). 
 22.  Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569, 1599–1600 
(2016). 
 23.  In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig. (NFL Concussion), 821 F.3d 410, 437–
41 (3d. Cir. 2016) (discussing the factors considered under Third Circuit precedent “when determining 
the fairness of a proposed settlement”). 
 24.  Amchem Prod., Inc., 521 U.S. at 602 n.5. 
 25.  NFL Concussion, 821 F.3d at 428–30. 
 26.  Id. at 421–22. 
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arbitration clauses inserted into every manner of consumer contract and 
employment relation.27 Tort cases tend to arise in extra-contractual settings, 
thereby foreclosing defendants’ ability to contract out of class proceedings—with 
the NFL being an odd hybrid because of it having arisen in the setting of 
professional sports. Without relitigating the particulars of NFL Concussion, I 
want to ask a different set of questions: what was it in judicial experience that 
made this case seemingly so ordinary at the final stage of settlement class 
approval, and what class action values have emerged through this experience that 
bear independent examination? 
My proposition is two-fold. The first is that the confining language of Rule 
23(b)(3) captures two competing impulses. One is to respect the ordinary 
presumption in favor of autonomy and the preservation of the individual interest 
in controlling one’s own legal fate. Per the Supreme Court, a class action is “an 
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the 
individual named parties only.”28 The second is that there are gains to be realized 
through coordination. As in all problems of collective action, we are forever 
confronted by one or another variant of the prisoner’s dilemma, the gnawing 
doubt that trust in others may be betrayed by their pursuit of narrow self-interest. 
We can avoid the “tragedy of the commons,”29 or more fiercely, the war of “all 
against all,” through cooperation.30 But such cooperation, especially among 
dispersed strangers, requires an institutional mechanism. The class action serves, 
in Judith Resnik’s term, as a subsidy to this kind of collective effort to achieve 
legal aims unavailable to the sole litigant.31 
This tension between a commitment to the individual stake in a legal claim 
and the need for collective action to realize any effective legal remedy is reflected 
in Rule 23 itself, and in the mandatory inquiries into manageability, 
predominance, superiority, and the desires of class members to control their own 
litigation. Viewed through the prism of a light-touch textualism, even these 
epigrammatic terms from the Rules highlight the tension that is being resolved 
by judicial experience. 
II 
COORDINATION AS AN INDEPENDENT PROCESS VALUE 
In interviewing Professor Miller, I pressed him on the awkward language of 
Rule 23(b)(3), seemingly alone in the Rules of that period in running together a 
series of convoluted formulations that seemed designed to burden the use of 
 
 27.  See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 623 (2012) (“[M]ost class cases will not survive the 
impending tsunami of class action waivers.”). 
 28.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 
700–01 (1979)). 
 29.  See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 30.  THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 186 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651). 
 31.  Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding 
Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2144–46 (2000). 
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equitable powers by the courts. In general, the revisions to Rule 23 had 
eliminated prior language that had no grounding in everyday speech, and had 
acquired little precision in case law—terms such as “true” or “spurious” class 
actions.32 Whereas the rest of the Rule was streamlined—a feature that has now 
partially succumbed to a prolix era—Rule 23(b)(3), like its predecessor, threw 
together terms of imprecise meaning and uncertain relation to prior cases. These 
terms dictated an initial inquiry into predominance and superiority, followed by 
a list of manageability and individual control considerations. From the beginning, 
the language reflected a tension between those on the Rules Committee that 
wanted to facilitate aggregation of low value claims and those that feared the 
potential for misbehavior in the guise of efficiency. The elaborate language of 
Rule 23(b)(3) was intended as a “safeguard,” said Miller, allowing some 
expansion into new domains, but as always, hopefully not too much.33 
The language of the Rule reflected the two competing values of individual 
autonomy and the efficiency of aggregation. Two values present in (b)(3)—
predominance and an assessment of litigant interest in controlling individual 
litigation—relate to individual autonomy and one’s presumptive control over a 
chose in action.34 In the cases that arose mostly in equity, notably the 
desegregation cases that were the primary concern of the rule revision,35 
individual autonomy could have little role in shaping an injunction or a 
declaratory judgment against a defendant. Clearly, no litigant could claim a right 
to a personal injunction either compelling or forbidding school desegregation, for 
a constitutional ruling would necessarily bind all affected parties. Even in cases 
for damages at law, many involved multiple passive victims of a generalized fraud 
or defective product. As Justice Ginsburg noted in Amchem, the Rule’s inquiry, 
especially into predominance, “is a test readily met in certain cases alleging 
consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws.”36 
Concerns for predominance and the desire of an individual to retain control 
over a cause of action certainly convey a distrust of where the reach of class 
actions might end up.37 The Supreme Court has long endorsed the idea of a 
property right in a chose in action; if compromised, “the injury is one to 
 
 32.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“Difficulties with the 
original rule. The categories of class actions in the original rule were defined in terms of the abstract 
nature of the rights involved: the so-called ‘true’ category . . . [and] the ‘spurious’ category . . . .”). 
 33.  Miller, supra note 1, at 116. 
 34.  A “chose in action” refers to “1. A proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another 
person, a share in a joint-stock company, or a claim for damages in tort. 2. The right to bring an action to 
recover a debt, money, or thing.” Chose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 35.  See e.g., David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953-
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and 
Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
 36.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). 
 37.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the 
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1574–75 (2007) (“[C]onclud[ing] that 
litigant autonomy should be acknowledged as . . . a foundational element of procedural due process . . . 
[and thus] Rule 23(b)(3) class actions . . . must . . . be deemed unconstitutional.”). 
10_ISSACHAROFF (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2021  4:05 PM 
No. 2 2021] RULE 23 AND THE TRIUMPH OF EXPERIENCE 167 
the right of property in the thing, and it is therefore unimportant as it respects 
the derivation of the title; it is sufficient if it belongs to the party bringing the suit 
at the time of the injury.”38 The injury is to the classic liberal right of autonomy 
in the disposition of property. As famously captured by John Locke, men must 
be able to “order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions and Persons, as 
they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without . . . depending 
upon the Will of any other Man. A State also of Equality, wherein all the Power 
and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.”39 This concept 
of litigant autonomy continues to underpin European refusal to afford res 
judicata effect to American class actions. The notion that parties might be bound 
to a judgment to which one did not affirmatively assent is widely perceived as 
compromising rights to individual autonomy guaranteed under European law.40 
Other components of Rule 23 reinforce concerns about individual rights and 
acquiescence. Most notably, the right to opt out of a (b)(3) class action gives a 
semblance of contractual voluntarism to the enforceability of a class decree. 
Similarly, the inquiry into adequacy of representation evokes the process of 
selecting leaders in both the public sphere and in private organizational 
structures, such as the selection of corporate directors. But these are poor 
substitutes for real participation. And if the point is to ensure something like 
democratic accountability, as through elections, this generally requires repeat 
play and the ability to reflect retrospectively on leadership in the next election; 
that is obviously missing in class actions.41 Even the right to opt out is rarely 
exercised—not surprisingly, for cases that do not justify individual prosecution 
typically do not justify the investment of personal resources to monitor the 
results.42 Only recently have the costs of personal participation in mass litigation 
dropped sufficiently so that some forms of participation by absent class members 
may supplement more traditional governance mechanisms in these cases.43 
In fact, neither contract nor democracy, whatever their normative appeal, 
captures the animating spirit of class actions. The fact that one does not opt out 
from an undertaking that offers little fortune on its own is a poor substitute for a 
 
 38.  Deshler v. Dodge, 57 U.S. 622, 631 (1853). 
 39.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 195–96 (Thomas Hollis ed., London, A. 
Millar et al. 1764). 
 40.  See Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in European 
Legal Systems, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 31, 37 (2008) (“[T]he opt-in requirement is fundamental to European 
legal systems and therefore a judgment rendered in respect of absent and even ignorant plaintiffs would 
be considered contrary to these countries’ concept of international public policy.”). 
 41.  Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3165, 3169, 3177 (2013). 
 42.  Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action 
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1548 (2004) (finding that opt out 
numbers are low in low value consumer cases and higher in mass tort cases, as value of claims rises). 
 43.  See generally Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017). 
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genuine meeting of the minds in classic contract tradition.44 It is closer to a 
contract of adhesion whose terms cannot be altered transactionally. Similarly, a 
court’s inquiry into the adequacy of representation is a far cry from the 
democratic capability to pass retrospective judgment on one’s leaders through 
periodic elections. Courts may test the sections of Rule 23 that mandate inquiry 
into predominance and adequacy of representation as part of the formal 
requirements of the Rule. But finding predominance of common issues or 
adequacy of representation does not capture the key question as to why 
something should proceed as a class action. 
At the same time, the language in Rule 23(b)(3) about whether “a class action 
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy” goes to something different. Loosely applying principles of 
statutory interpretation, both the text of the Rule itself and Professor Miller’s 
account of the concerns at the time indicate that the drafters meant to do more 
than subject free-standing individual claims to administrative joinder. I leave to 
the side whether the language of the Rules deserves the same deference as 
statutory or constitutional language, whether the Advisory Committee notes 
constitute an actual legislative history, or what should be the relative weight of 
text, purpose, and history in interpretation. A simple “light touch” textual 
reading shows that the words point to concerns about the overall administration 
of justice, measured in terms of the substantive results of aggregate litigation 
rather than the nature of the rights-holder. 
The superiority requirement and the inquiry about the “manageability” of a 
single aggregated proceeding focus on the benefits to be gained through 
coordination, and the relative costs and benefits of individual or collective 
litigation. In part this is a question of whether the focus of the litigation is on the 
upstream conduct of the defendant as opposed to the downstream impact on 
individual plaintiffs.45 But I want to suggest here that there is more at issue. The 
text of Rule 23(b)(3) directs an inquiry into the rationale for concerted 
prosecution, a time-honored account of the benefits of coordination. 
In political theory, contract and coordination draw on different justifications. 
Whereas contract recognizes a volitional exchange of one’s property for a desired 
aim, coordination does not claim the same authority. For Locke, and for the 
contractarian tradition more broadly, the root of agreement comes in the right of 
disposition of property, an endowment that in turn stems from exalted natural 
law principles, such as the transformation of fallow land.46 But coordination 
claims a more prosaic utilitarian justification in terms of what returns result. Its 
leading exponent is not Locke but David Hume, for whom “the goods of human 
 
 44.  See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 
86–87 (2003) (arguing that small-claim class members tend to be relatively uninformed about potential 
legal claims). 
 45.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, § 2.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(distinguishing upstream focus from downstream cases that must assess individual harm on a class-
member basis). 
 46.  LOCKE, supra note 39, 197–99. 
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society stem largely from doing as others do, in certain limited but crucial matters, 
so that each person’s purposes in all other matters will mutually further others’ 
purposes instead of crossing them.”47 In such “coordination contexts we act from 
interest and serve the mutual benefit.”48 
The gains from cooperation transform an agglomeration of individual claims 
into something greater than their sum, much as a corporation may create wealth 
by binding individual investors to aggregated economic pursuits. The concept of 
an institutional form emerging from disparate legal claims is best captured by 
David Shapiro’s concept of the class as an “entity,” a corporate body that stands 
above and apart from its constituent parts: 
[T]he entity is the litigant and the client. Moreover, in the situations in which class action 
treatment is warranted, the individual who is a member of the class, for whatever 
purpose, is and must remain a member of that class, and as a result must tie his fortunes 
to those of the group with respect to the litigation, its progress, and its outcome.49 
On this account, class actions resemble limited venture corporations 
organized for one single undertaking, with the Rules providing the distinct 
internal commands of governance. Such limited liability ventures are well known 
in history, with my favorite analogy being to the Venetian grant of legal status to 
the sea-faring commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which 
formed only for the duration of a single trading mission.”50 In effect, Rule 23 
confers the exclusive legal personhood to the class and allows it to bind class 
members in order to pursue mutual gains that were unavailable individually. And 
like the commenda, which unleashed the seafaring merchant power of Venice, 
the Rules allowed the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar to forge new economic 
ventures in the form of class actions that would test the boundaries of what the 
courts could handle. To the extent that class actions could resolve disputes with 
gains for all the participants, the judicial comfort evident in cases such as NFL 
Concussion could be realized. 
III 
CAPTURING JOINT GAINS 
The virtues of coordination are generally implicit rather than explicit in 
decisional law. This largely results from the posture of most litigated challenges 
to class certification. When the opponent of certification is a defendant seeking 
to force all individuals into futile private endeavors, or a serial objector who 
claims an individual entitlement as a hold-up threat, challenges that focus on the 
nature of individual entitlements are strategic. Almost invariably this steers the 
challenge to class certification into a discussion of the predominance of individual 
 
 47.  ANDREW SABL, HUME’S POLITICS: COORDINATION AND CRISIS IN THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 6 (2012). 
 48.  RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 18 (2000). 
 49.  David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 
919 (1998). 
 50.  DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, 
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012). 
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versus common issues. The result is a highly unsatisfying body of case law that 
asks whether common issues outnumber individual inquiries,51 the amount of trial 
time that would be devoted to each (even if approval of a settlement class was at 
issue),52 and the persistence of individual inquiries over reliance, choice of law, 
or damages.53 Courts try to grapple with this within the framework of the 
predominance inquiry, but the result is generally frustrating.54 
Case law built around strategic invocations of individual autonomy tilt the 
jurisprudence away from serious engagement with the reasons class actions 
continue to thrive. For courts faced with mass harms, the question is not whether 
to aggregate but how to aggregate. Although not guided by the case law, courts 
increasingly recognize the gains from coordinated activity, and have started to 
recognize those concrete gains alongside formal concerns with predominance or 
the putative individual interest in controlling litigation. A decade ago, the 
American Law Institute remarked on the growing attention to the independent 
value of comprehensive resolution of disputes—what is termed “global peace”—
in securing more for a cohesive group than what disparate individuals could hope 
for.55 Comprehensive resolution offers “predictability and conclusiveness . . . to 
bring into existence additional resources for distribution by way of the class 
settlement.” And the ensuing global peace generates a “peace premium” 
available only through a class resolution.56 
Such a “peace premium” stems from the lower anticipated transaction costs 
for a defendant facing no further litigation. But it also reflects the value of 
dispelling the stigma and uncertainty that follows from potential liability. 
Realizing this collective benefit, which by definition cannot be realized by any 
litigant operating individually, may provide one element of the “superiority” 
anticipated by the language of the Rules. 
 
 51.  E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622–25 (1997); Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33–36 (2013); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2013); 
see also 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4:49, 4:52 (5th ed. 2012) 
(articulating the predominance requirement and providing examples). 
 52.  By and large, parties to settlements address the predominance issue to the satisfaction of 
reviewing courts. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, § 4:77 (noting that cases generally show that “courts have 
granted certification at settlement after themselves having denied it for trial purposes”). There are, 
however, the occasional misfires that raise predominance of trial issues even in the settlement context. 
See, e.g., In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 881 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 53.  See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 792–800 (2013) 
(highlighting these as areas of doctrinal resistance to class actions). 
 54.  See, e.g., Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Predominance is 
not, however, a matter of nose-counting. Rather, more important questions apt to drive the resolution of 
the litigation are given more weight in the predominance analysis over individualized questions which 
are of considerably less significance to the claims of the class.”) (citation omitted). 
 55.  In turn, the concept developed from the observations of Francis McGovern. See Francis E. 
McGovern, Toward A Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1867, 1894 (2000) (formulating the term as a “peace premium for corporate predictability”). 
 56.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.10 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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This intuition can be grounded in recent class action case law, with an initial 
example to set the inquiry. In Sullivan v. DB Investments,57 the Third Circuit 
confronted a proposed settlement of a national antitrust case against De Beers, 
the giant South African diamond conglomerate. De Beers was notoriously and 
openly a cartel. But it scrupulously maintained all its operations outside the 
United States, even though its market domination conditioned prices in every 
corner of the world.58 For more than half a century, antitrust challenges 
floundered on the legal obstacles this imposed, including such mundane issues as 
personal jurisdiction and service of process.59 De Beers conducted its direct 
transactions only with foreign intermediaries who in turn sold to wholesalers that 
imported the product into the American market. Cartel power yielded the ability 
to dominate sales in the United States, but from a safe perch beyond this country. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, Russia began mass production of 
cheaper and mostly lower-quality diamonds, which flooded the market and began 
to erode the effectiveness of the De Beers cartel. For the first time, De Beers 
sought to tap into the American retail market to profit from its strategic market 
presence and the brand value of its name. But to do so would require a presence 
in the United States that in turn could serve as the basis for liability under the 
American antitrust laws and their presumption of treble damages. The pull of 
American consumers directly met the push of liability. 
Not surprisingly, a deal was in the offing. De Beers would accept service of 
process and submit to personal jurisdiction in the United States, in exchange for 
a structured deal covering its past liabilities.60 What is significant is that, absent a 
comprehensive deal, there could be no release from litigation that would allow 
for entry into the American market.61 Without coordination, no plaintiff standing 
alone would fare any better than plaintiffs in all the prior efforts to pursue claims 
against De Beers. For De Beers, there was a huge market reward if the deal could 
be consummated. For the class of purchasers of diamonds in the retail jewelry 
market—termed indirect purchasers in the antitrust context—De Beers offered 
 
 57.  667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 58.  Id. at 300. 
 59.  See id. at 314 (“De Beers’s avoidance of effective antitrust prosecution in light of the twin 
difficulties of obtaining jurisdiction over the foreign corporations and of retaining within the court’s reach 
tangible assets sufficient to enforce a decree.”) (quoting The Diamond Cartel, 56 YALE L.J. 1404, 1411 
(1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60.  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 288, 291. 
 61.  Some would argue that there should be no unanimity requirement and that more individual 
autonomy is preserved by allowing a 98% level of acceptance or a 95% level of acceptance so that the 
pressure to compel client acceptance is not so overwhelming. Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with 
All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979, 1024 (2010); see also Howard M. 
Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 859, 864 (2016) (arguing that class action settlements have the propensity to unjustly disempower 
claimants). This has the feel of debates over moving first base back five feet to avoid close plays; wherever 
the threshold is set, the question becomes whether the gains from coordination can be factored into the 
reason to have a class action. See THE GIGANTIC BOOK OF BASEBALL QUOTATIONS 63 (Wayne Stewart 
ed., 2007) (“‘They should move first base back one step to eliminate all those close plays.’ – 
Outfielder/designated hitter John Lowenstein.”). 
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a payoff of over $272 million, with another $22.5 million going to direct 
purchasers.62 All in all, this was a fairly common class settlement, closing out 
liability in exchange for a damages payment and some injunctive relief against 
future anticompetitive activity. 
But there was a problem: not all plaintiffs were identically situated. At least 
some of the claims were arguably more valuable in states that allowed what is 
termed an “Illinois Brick repealer,” meaning that indirect purchasers had an 
independent cause of action even though they had not purchased directly from 
the cartel. By contrast, purchasers in “non-repealer” states could not sue, and 
could only hope that direct purchasers would protect them against 
anticompetitive behavior. To be sure, Rule 23(a)(2) speaks only of common 
issues, not identical issues, and Rule 23(b)(3) insists that common issues must 
predominate, not that they must be exclusive. Nonetheless, on its face, this was a 
genuine intraclass distinction, yielding more valuable claims for some class 
members, and potentially no claims for others who were limited to recovery as 
indirect purchasers in a non-repealer state. In addition, there were state 
consumer protection law claims that varied state-by-state. The challengers, and 
an initial panel of the Third Circuit, were persuaded that “a district court must 
ensure that each class member possesses a viable claim or ‘some colorable legal 
claim.’”63 
But even at this level, the cases were complicated. After all, a resident of a 
non-repealer state could have bought a diamond while traveling to another state 
or may have been asserting a claim based on the first sale of a particular diamond 
in New York, the port of entry for the bulk of the American diamond market. 
Perhaps the state of purchase allowed for the extraterritorial protection of 
consumers, or perhaps the state antitrust laws of one or another state allowed an 
extra modicum of legal protection and potential recovery. These were potential 
differences among all class members, and they muddied the waters as to whether 
common issues predominated. Indeed, that is what the original panel had ruled,64 
and what the dissent on rehearing continued to advocate.65 
What then? It would be possible, at least in theory, to trace the appropriate 
choice of law for each of the many thousand class members, but only at a cost far 
exceeding the small value of most consumer diamond purchases. Such an 
approach would doom a class action just as surely as requiring individual actions. 
In Judge Posner’s memorable formulation, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for 
$30.”66 In the small value context, “the realistic alternative to a class action is not 
 
 62.  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 288. 
 63.  Id. at 285. 
 64.  Id. at 293–94. 
 65.  Id. at 346 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“Because of differences among those statutes, it is clear that 
some class members are entirely without a cognizable claim. . . . ‘[S]uch variances . . . are so significant as 
to defeat commonality and predominance even in a settlement class certification[.]’”) (quoting In re 
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 529–30 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 66.  Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits.”67 By extension, raising the 
transactional cost of a consumer class action by requiring these individualized 
inquiries would doom the collective enterprise every bit as surely as the limited 
value of the underlying individual claims would doom efforts at individual 
litigation. 
The Third Circuit, now acting en banc, addressed this issue as a matter of the 
manageability of a class action, as a court routinely confronting an onslaught of 
litigation arising from the undifferentiated conduct of a particular actor: 
[W]here a defendant’s singular conduct gives rise to one cause of action in one state, 
while providing for a different cause of action in another jurisdiction, the courts may 
group both claims in a single class action. This tactic in litigation advances the laudatory 
purposes of the class action device, “preserv[ing] the resources of both the courts and 
the parties by permitting issues affecting all class members to be litigated in an efficient, 
expedited, and manageable fashion.”68 
But that could hardly be all; a refusal to certify the class would have doomed any 
individual enforcement action to the likely lack of personal jurisdiction, and the 
insufficiency of individual stakes to incentivize an effort to overcome that legal 
hurdle. So, the real question before the court was whether there could be private 
redress for systematic conduct with wide effects. 
Sullivan presented an extreme version of a phenomenon that I have 
previously described as “private rights, aggregate claims”69—an endowment of 
rights to individual persons that have value as legal claims only when joined 
together with others. Most often, this is the problem of “negative value” claims, 
in which the transactional costs of vindication exceed the expected return from 
prosecution of the legal action. This is what Judge Posner captured in referring 
to the (hopefully) limited population of lunatics and fanatics who would bring 
such claims. Courts frequently refer to such negative value claims as a significant 
factor favoring class certification.70 But transactional costs are not the entire story 
and represent a subset of a broader universe of gains from coordination. 
Amortizing the costs of litigation is one reason that there are gains from 
proceeding in the aggregate, and may be the most significant in many cases. But 
the inquiry goes beyond the cost calculus. 
Class actions are but one of a series of coordinating devices that compel 
transactional completion in the resolution of legal claims. A state may bring a 
 
 67.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 68.  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 302 (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 
1998)). 
 69.  Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183. 
 70.  Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The most compelling rationale 
for finding superiority in a class action . . . [is] the existence of a negative value suit.”); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In most class actions—and those the ones in 
which the rationale for the procedure is most compelling—individual suits are infeasible because the 
claim of each class member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, § 
4:65 (discussing the “[s]uperiority [of class actions] in small claim or vulnerable population cases”). 
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parens patriae action asserting the rights of all its affected citizens.71 Similarly, a 
probate hearing must compel the complete resolution of all claims against an 
estate, and a bankruptcy proceeding must similarly resolve all claims against a 
distressed business in deciding whether to liquidate or restructure as an ongoing 
concern. In all such circumstances the rights belong to an individual, but cannot 
be vindicated without collective resolution. In individual hands, such rights are 
phantasmagoric, a semblance of reality like the shadows in Plato’s allegory of the 
cave. Without a mechanism for vindication, these rights have form but no 
substance. 
Bankruptcy well recognizes the interplay between private entitlement and 
collective redress. The claim of a creditor in bankruptcy arises from private 
contractual relations and, classically, that chose in action is a private endowment 
of a property claim. Yet there is no due process right to individual vindication of 
such a creditor’s claim because the beneficial disposition of the corpus of the 
debtor turns on joint resolution of all creditor obligations. Bankruptcy therefore 
recognizes the individual source of the right to recover but presumes that any 
such recovery will be through the aggregate. 
As a result, bankruptcy law and procedure are replete with analyses of how 
to protect the individual interest through the collective resolution, starting with 
the formation of creditor’s committees, and continuing through the recognition 
of priorities of different claims on the estate, and finally ending up in the equal 
treatment of comparably situated claimants.72 The aims of all these aggregative 
devices largely converge,73 with one exception. Bankruptcy and probate start 
from the assumption that there must be collective resolution and then adjust 
individual protections accordingly, whereas ordinary civil litigation starts from 
the premise of individual autonomy, even where aggregate proceedings are 
inevitable. Troy McKenzie develops this point in arguing for the comparative 
advantage of bankruptcy as a model for mass adjudication, particularly in the 
mass tort context: 
The major element running throughout the architecture of the bankruptcy process is 
that the judicial system and society benefit from unified proceedings in a single forum 
in which all interested parties in the debtor’s fate are represented. For mass tort 
litigation, that conception of the role of a court in guiding litigation has obvious 
advantages for the management and equitable resolution of a multitude of claims. The 
judicial system as a whole benefits from the reduction in duplicative and competing 
 
 71.  On the parallels and competing benefits of class actions and parens patriae actions including the 
risk of agency costs, see generally Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative 
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012). 
 72.  1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (16th ed. 2020) (describing the basic tenets of American 
bankruptcy law). 
 73.  See In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 242 n.57, 245 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[S]ettlement must 
provide for ‘equity among members of the class’ and ‘fairness of the distribution of the fund among class 
members’ . . . . Though Ortiz was decided under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B), the Court’s requirement of 
fair treatment for all claimants—a principle at the core of equity—also applies in the context of this case.” 
(citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 854–55 (1999))) (“In the resolution of future asbestos 
liability, under bankruptcy or otherwise, future claimants must be adequately represented throughout 
the process.” (citing Amchem, Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–28 (1997))). 
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proceedings. Claimants benefit from the greater attention to equitable treatment of 
claims for compensation. And society benefits from the closer calibration of a 
defendant’s conduct to the compensation the defendant will pay for harms caused by 
that conduct.74 
Further, bankruptcy presumes that there will be gains from the unified resolution 
of all creditors’ claims, and that this will accrue to the benefit of all those with 
demands upon the estate. There is a reason that bankruptcy proved to be the 
coordination mechanism in asbestos cases following the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Amchem and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp..75 Bankruptcy also introduces 
the critical element of voting to allow stakeholders to vindicate their individual 
rights within the aggregate.76 
Sullivan significantly advances the inquiry in class action law by moving the 
discussion of those joint gains, now embraced under the term of “global peace,” 
front and center in class action law parallel to the view advocated by the 
American Law Institute. For the Third Circuit, compelling a reviewing court to 
limit a class settlement to individuals with an established claim “would effectively 
rule out the ability of a defendant to achieve ‘global peace’ by obtaining releases 
from all those who might wish to assert claims, meritorious or not.”77 The court 
went on to credit the underlying interest that could only be achieved by a 
comprehensive resolution: 
[I]n an effort to avoid protracted litigation and future relitigation of settled questions in 
federal and state courts across numerous jurisdictions, De Beers pursued a global 
settlement and demanded a release of potential damage claims in all fifty states . . . . 
Specifically, De Beers sought “global peace” in a settlement covering plaintiffs in every 
federal and state case, as well as potential plaintiffs who had not yet filed cases in either 
federal or state court.78 
Such a return to finality cannot be realized by any individual claimant in 
negotiating the terms of an individual settlement nor, correspondingly, can it be 
achieved by the defendant in settlement with any particular claimant. Professor 
Rave explains the gain-gain scenario that prompts the greater returns for all 
claimants if a comprehensive deal can be realized: 
[A] global settlement generates efficiencies and saves on transaction costs for 
defendants as well as plaintiffs. Handling claims in bulk is more cost effective for 
defendants. Accordingly, the cost of litigating against a few opt-outs may be 
disproportionately high – the flip side of the economies of scale in aggregation. There 
are simply fewer cases across which to spread the costs of developing common factual 
or legal issues that will arise at trial. Further, if defendants can offer a lump sum and 
disclaim any role in the allocation, they can avoid the cost of valuing and negotiating 
 
 74.  Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 97 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 960, 1004–05 (2012). 
 75.  See Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1741–
50 (2002) (describing challenges of mass tort as problems of coordination among the various 
constellations of defendants, plaintiffs, and courts that are typically involved). 
 76.  In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 244 (3d Cir. 2004) (“By providing impaired creditors 
the right to vote on confirmation, the Bankruptcy Code ensures the terms of the reorganization are 
monitored by those who have a financial stake in its outcome.”). 
 77.  Sullivan v. DB Invs., 667 F.3d 273, 310 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 78.  Id. at 310–11. 
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individual claims. And broad settlements give defendants better returns on the sunk 
costs they have already spent on valuation and negotiation. The marginal cost of adding 
another claim to a group settlement is typically less than the cost of negotiating a 
separate settlement. For similar reasons, defendants will often pay to settle even weak 
claims as part of a global deal to avoid the nuisance of protracted litigation . . . . 
[Further,] defendants may be willing to pay extra for finality because it reduces the 
chances that future losses at trial or serial settlements will encourage the filing of new 
claims.79 
To circle back to NFL Concussion, the prior experience of Sullivan and 
similar cases allowed the Third Circuit to give independent weight to the need 
for closure to improve the condition of the entire class of retired football players. 
For the NFL, a main consideration was the public explosiveness of the charge 
that “despite the NFL’s awareness of the risks of repetitive head trauma, the 
League ignored, minimized, or outright suppressed information concerning the 
link between that trauma and cognitive damage.”80 On the other side of the 
ledger, the former players faced having most of their claims preempted by federal 
labor laws governing the interpretation of the NFL’s collective bargaining 
agreements.81 For the NFL, the glare of adverse publicity was a vulnerability, but 
one that could only be addressed in the aggregate—discovery in any individual 
case could yield the same information, assuming that individual cases could 
justify the expenses of the process. For the retired players, any legal resolution of 
preemption, even in an individual case, threatened the viability of all litigation as 
a practical matter, as did the hurdle of translating epidemiological evidence into 
the causation for any particular player’s injuries.82 
Doctrinally, consistent with how litigation challenges are framed, the opinion 
in NFL Concussion pushed the inquiry into the framework of predominance.83 A 
handful of individual objectors claimed that their interests were not represented 
and that other issues of latent injuries compromised predominance of the 
settlement terms. The major doctrinal innovation of the opinion—crediting the 
number of private lawsuits and non-class lawyers as evidence of the oversight on 
the quality of the deal obtained84—was considered under the rather ill-fitting 
rubric of adequacy of representation. The court looked to the extraordinary 
number of lawyers scrutinizing the deal to confirm that real stakeholders 
appreciated the benefits obtained from the overall settlement. The court took the 
challenges doctrinally as presented: individuals claiming that adequacy of 
representation or predominance were not met. But the court’s resolution would 
not have made sense without the core insight that there were gains from 
coordination, and that those had been realized to the benefit of the entire class. 
 
 79.  Rave, supra note 21, at 1194; see also Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill 
Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 414, 417 (2014) (analyzing the greater 
returns available as a result of comprehensive settlement following Deepwater Horizon spill). 
 80.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Inj. Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 439–40. 
 83.  Id. at 434. 
 84.  Id. at 433. 
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IV 
TESTING THE BOUNDARIES 
Returning to the language, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to find “that the 
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”85 
As discussed earlier, these can be thought of as presenting the two sides of 
aggregation: integrity in the handling of private rights of action and overcoming 
coordination problems in seeking aggregated resolution. Cases such as NFL 
Concussion or Sullivan address the initial hurdle of excessive attention to 
individual claims based on narrow interpretations of predominance. NFL 
Concussion goes one step further in allowing active participation and monitoring 
by a substantial portion of the class to be a guarantee of proper representation. 
Each of these cases underscores the gains to be realized from global resolution, 
not only for the defendants, but for the collective welfare of the plaintiff classes. 
But these cases stop short of addressing exactly how to overcome the deleterious 
consequences of allowing individual class member to hold out for a 
disproportionate share by objecting or threatening to opt out of any proposed 
global resolution. 
The ability to claim an individual premium after a potential deal is struck is 
the foothold for strategic objectors to class actions.86 Once the deal is in place, 
the need for global resolution allows for a hold-out by the last class member 
standing whose participation is necessary for the deal to close. The preferred 
mechanism for such strategic objectors is to file a notice of appeal after a 
perfunctory objection in the district court, and then to offer to withdraw that 
appeal for a premium, generally paid to objector’s counsel. The intervention of 
such objectors reduces the benefit for the class because both the defendant and 
class counsel have to withhold some of the potential class payment in order to 
pay off subsequent extortion. The 2018 reforms of Rule 23(e) sought to curb that 
practice by requiring disclosure to the district court of any side payment 
arrangements, hoping thereby to deter an evident strategic impediment to being 
able to negotiate for global peace. 
Unfortunately, such strategic objectors are not the only obstacle to obtaining 
the peace premium that comes with complete resolution. Most class actions are 
settled before a litigation class is certified, meaning that class counsel and the 
class representatives cannot claim any conclusive authority to represent all class 
members. To the extent the defendant is willing to reward completion, the ability 
to achieve global peace remains speculative. Class settlements typically contract 
around this with a minimum participation threshold—frequently termed a “blow 
 
 85.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 86.  Robert Klonoff, Class Action Objectors: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 89 FORD. L. REV. 
475, 477 (2021) (defining ugly objectors as those that “raise objections not to improve the settlement but 
to extort payments from class counsel in exchange for dismissing their objections. Such objectors do not 
even arguably serve a legitimate purpose”). 
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provision”—that defines a walk-away right for the defendant.87 Such 
negotiations, however, risk leaving potential benefits on the table in the form of 
funds reserved to address opt outs who continue to litigate, in addition to buying 
off strategic objectors. 
The inability to commit ahead of time to a coordinated strategy is a variant 
of the tragedy of the commons, particularly when stakeholders have different 
claims that might prompt strategic holdouts. As Professors McGovern and 
Rubinstein explain, 
Heterogeneous classes therefore present a collective action problem somewhat akin to 
a prisoner’s dilemma: everyone in the group might be best off – along several 
dimensions – if they could work together, but lacking a clear mechanism by which to do 
so, coordination costs render that option illusive. The tragedy of this commons is that, 
built on a different template, class action law does not immediately appear to provide a 
coordination mechanism.88 
In individual litigation, parties can agree to coordinate by waiving conflicts, 
as with a wife and husband agreeing to be represented by the same estate lawyer, 
so long as they are sophisticated enough to trade off the transactional gains 
against the potential conflicts.89 The question becomes whether the same 
elements can be realized in aggregated proceedings. In such aggregated 
proceedings, there is the compounding problem that the mass of potential 
claimants present themselves as an undifferentiated bundle, each of which has 
the ability to opt out. For defendants, there is the overwhelming risk of adverse 
selection as a result of the right of class action plaintiffs to opt out. “When 
plaintiffs can opt-out of settlements, there is a danger that those with the 
strongest claims will do so, leaving a defendant with a settlement dominated by 
weak claims.”90 
A New Jersey state case posed the collective action issue in provocative 
fashion outside the class action context. A group of franchisees of a national tax 
preparation service decided to sue collectively and agreed to bind themselves to 
joint funding of the lawsuit, a predetermined recovery schedule, and an 
agreement to be bound by the outcome of any settlement if a supermajority voted 
 
 87.  4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:6 (5th ed. Dec. 2020 update) 
(explaining that these provisions allow “the defendant to withdraw from—or ‘blow up’—a settlement if 
a certain number of class members opt out of the settlement”); see also D. Theodore Rave, Closure 
Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2180 (2017) (addressing “walk-away 
provisions”). 
 88.  Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative Approach 
to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, 99 TEX. L. REV. 73, 78 (2020). 
 89.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 cmt. D (AM. L. INST. 2000) 
(“A client’s open-ended agreement to consent to all conflicts normally should be ineffective unless the 
client possesses sophistication in the matter in question and has had the opportunity to receive 
independent legal advice about the consent.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (“[I]f 
the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the 
risk that a conflict may arise, [general and open-ended] consent is more likely to be effective.”). 
 90.  Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 733, 760 (1997). 
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in favor.91 An agreement was reached, a vote was taken, but then a hold-out 
challenged the ability to enforce the outcome. The case clearly presented the 
Lockean private right to a chose in action against the Humean gain from 
coordinated action. The New Jersey Supreme Court hesitated, found the contract 
enforceable in the immediate case, but then expressed skepticism that this could 
be done and pushed the question of such arrangements off to the rules process 
prospectively. But the question endured: Why cannot a sophisticated group of 
commonly situated litigants form their own commenda, a limited liability joint 
venture with clear rules of participation and internal resolution? Every purchase 
of stock, every purchase of a condominium, every membership at a gym, all are 
contractual realizations of potential joint gains at the cost of yielding elements of 
personal autonomy to specified forms of organization. Why not a joint litigation 
venture among the same people who routinely buy stock, homes, and club 
memberships? If global peace is a collective good, why cannot those who benefit 
by it agree ahead of time on the rules by which it might be realized? 
The American Law Institute proposed just such an approach,92 adapting the 
voting system from Section 524(g) of the bankruptcy code governing agreed upon 
resolution of asbestos insolvencies93 and proposing similar supermajority 
resolution for common legal undertakings.94 Such an approach would not help 
small-claim consumer actions,95 but would create the ability to form a class-like 
mechanism without the formality of Rule 23. In effect, the ALI approach allowed 
a class-like mechanism to emerge from private ordering rather than judicial 
decree, reflecting a world of complex cases in which closure became the desired 
end state.96 The ALI proposal, to borrow from Professor Lahav, did not come 
from nowhere, but reflected the maturing judicial understanding that “aggregate 
solutions are inevitable and aggregation takes on whichever form most easily 
allows cases to travel towards settlement.”97 By whichever pathway, the various 
forms of aggregation share both central problematics and aims. As summarized 
by Lahav, these are the goal of “horizontal equity” among the stakeholders, the 
risk of principal-agent costs as individuals are subsumed in the aggregate, and the 
 
 91.  Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006) (holding that a retainer 
agreement containing a weighted-majority provision for settlement of the litigation would be 
unenforceable under Rule 1.8(g); however, the court upheld the settlement in question and applied its 
decision only prospectively). 
 92.  PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17 (AM. L. INST. 2010). Once again, a 
disclosure: Together with Robert Klonoff, Richard Nagareda, and Charles Silver, I served as the 
Reporter for the ALI on this undertaking. 
 93.  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). 
 94.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17 cmt. d(2) (AM. L. INST. 2010) 
(“Sophisticated clients, such as businesspersons or investors, are more likely than others to appreciate 
the benefits and risks of subjecting themselves to some form of substantial-majority rule.”). 
 95.  For skepticism that claimants can rely on democratic mechanisms if the stakes are low, see 
Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 86–87 (2003). 
 96.  Morgan A. McCollum, Local Government Plaintiffs and the Opioid Multi-District Litigation, 94 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 938 (2019). 
 97.  Alexandra D. Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, 53 GA. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2019). 
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need to reconcile global resolution with the decentralized system of dispute 
resolution across multiple states and the federal-state divide.98 
From that came the most innovative effort at realizing collective gains from 
aggregated litigation. Fittingly in an issue devoted to the achievements of Francis 
McGovern, the undertaking came from him and Professor Rubinstein. The effort 
is to realize the gains from global peace by inviting class members to agree to be 
bound by collective resolution based on a clear supermajority vote, drawing on 
the ALI proposal, and in turn on the experience with asbestos bankruptcies and 
the New Jersey state tax franchisees’ collective action. Voting is key under 
bankruptcy because “providing impaired creditors the right to vote on 
confirmation, the Bankruptcy Code ensures the terms of the reorganization are 
monitored by those who have a financial stake in its outcome.”99 
The proposal goes thus: 
As applied in the class context, the idea unfolds in five stages: (1) active class members 
initially work together to generate a distributional metric for allocating a lump sum 
settlement among the class members and a related voting scheme for responding to any 
proposed settlement; (2) once these mechanisms are in place, putative class counsel 
moves for certification of an opt-out Rule 23(b)(3) class, with certification limited to the 
sole purpose of negotiating a lump sum settlement with the defendant; (3) if the court 
grants class certification, class members receive notice explaining the allocation metric 
and the supermajority voting scheme and they are given a one-time opportunity to opt 
out of the class; (4) after the opt-out period ends and the class size is fixed, the class’s 
counsel and representatives attempt to negotiate a lump sum settlement with one or 
more defendants; (5) if achieved, the amount of the lump sum is put to a classwide vote, 
and if it garners supermajority support, the entire class is bound by that vote; class 
counsel and the defendant then move for final judicial approval of the settlement.100 
This proposal was realized in what is termed the “negotiation class” in the 
National Prescription Opiate Litigation. Fittingly, the litigation exists across all 
frontiers of aggregation, with Purdue Pharma in bankruptcy, state level litigation 
in various courts, a nationwide MDL of all the cities and counties that have filed 
suit, and, finally, the proposed creation of a pre-arranged negotiation entity in an 
MDL proceeding. The architects of the proposal, Professors McGovern and 
Rubinstein, served as special masters in the opioid MDL and could help usher 
their proposal from the drawing board to lived experience. The aim was to realize 
collective benefits through bargaining and voting: “By providing a mechanism for 
keeping the whole class together as a bargaining unit, the negotiation class’s 
primary goal is to resolve the collective action problem presented by a 
heterogeneous class of large and small stakeholders.”101 
As with many first steps, the results are mixed. The proposal was approved 
by the district court and then reversed by a split panel of the Sixth Circuit.102 
Because I served as counsel to advocate adoption in both the district court and 
 
 98.  Id. at 1404–09. 
 99.  In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 244 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 100.  McGovern & Rubenstein, supra note 88, at 79. 
 101.  Id. at 104. 
 102.  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 2020). 
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the Sixth Circuit, I will leave further elaboration to others. Suffice it to say that, 
in keeping with Professor Lahav’s assessment of the evolving understanding of 
aggregation, this proposal too “did not come out of nowhere.”103 Whether the 
precise form of the negotiation class perseveres on future application or is 
replaced by another mechanism, no approach to redressing mass harm will ever 
return to the presumed halcyon days of one-by-one adjudication. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
More than a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes captured the heart of the 
common law methodology: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has 
been experience . . . . The law embodies the story of a nation’s development 
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the 
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”104 
When pressed about the perceived need to reform the Federal Rules only a 
quarter century after their initial adoption, Arthur Miller invoked the Holmesian 
concept of law as a distillation of lived experience. The joinder rules as initially 
promulgated in 1938 “were underused, and it was thought time to rationalize 
them, to tie them together better than they had been tied in the 30s, and to clarify 
the text to capture the 25 years of experience, and to insert that experience under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the rules.”105 
Much has changed in the scale and reach of class actions since the major 
reforms of Rule 23 in 1966, driven in the Holmesian sense by the growing 
confidence of the judicial ability to manage increasingly complex social issues and 
the ability to realize the benefits of collective resolution.  As judicial experience 
with large class actions has grown, courts have come to appreciate the value of 
global peace as providing greater benefits than could ever be realized in isolated 
litigation, even were that to be pursued.  The core argument presented in this 
Article is that the open-textured language of the Rules invites judicial 
experimentation and that this experience becomes the lifeblood of the evolution 
of the law. 
For reasons well beyond the scope of this Article, the reforms of today move 
through judicial innovation rather than formal rules amendment; the latter trails 
rather than leads. The first conclusion that emerges is the increasing judicial 
capacity to engage in “midstream corrections” that innovate “while litigation is 
pending, in response to problems that arise in specific disputes, resulting in ad 
hoc procedure.”106 What begins ad hoc gets refined through practice. Whatever 
the formal amendments to Rule 23 in the years after 1966, what changed most 
between the initial skepticism over the class resolution of mass harm cases and 
 
 103.  Lahav, supra note 97, at 1403. 
 104.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1881). 
 105.  Miller, supra note 1, at 107. 
 106.  Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 774 (2017). 
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NFL Concussion was the testing of judicial innovation and the emerging 
confidence in the ability of aggregative procedures to address major societal 
concerns. 
The second conclusion also pushes the boundaries of this Article. Much of 
the innovation of what is termed “ad hoc procedure” occurs through the give and 
take of case management. These matters become the deep wisdom of courts that 
must handle the large disaster cases. By contrast, doctrine reflects only the 
manner in which cases are presented for final adjudication. Thus, in the sweeping 
resolution of the VW emissions scandal, the Ninth Circuit responded only to 
objectors who were either trying to insinuate themselves into the settlement by 
claiming a trivial conflict in representation of resold versus owner-retained cars107 
or by demanding attorneys’ fees in disregard of the district court’s case 
management orders.108 Only the most discerning interstitial reader could piece 
together the complex organizational structure that allowed the entire controversy 
to be resolved in barely a year. Similarly, because so much of the class action law 
is generated by strategic objectors claiming that their ability to vindicate their $30 
claim is compromised by nefarious aggregative procedures, the law is heavily 
focused on the predominance prong of Rule 23(b)(3). Predominance is only one 
of the lines of inquiry of Rule 23(b)(3), but it is the one that sounds most clearly 
in a Lockean claim to inalienable individual rights. 
For courts tasked with the great mass cases of the day, the question is one of 
the equitable administration of justice and the efficient use of judicial resources. 
Rule 23(b)(3) assigns these values to the superiority prong of the class inquiry, a 
recognition of the Humean insight into coordinated behavior. While not as 
prominent in the case law, this well captures the practices in courts today. 
Amchem may still define the doctrinal contours of mass harm class actions. 
Judicial experience moves on. 
 
 
 107.  In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg. Litig., 895 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 108.  In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg. Litig., 914 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2019). 
